LCDR James M. Ennes, Jr. in Memoriam

On the day of the attack, the Liberty was reconnoitered multiple times by Israeli military aircraft over the span of several daylight hours and positively identified as an American ship flying the American flag. The Liberty never approached closer than thirty-eight nautical miles to the Israeli coast. Nevertheless, while steaming in clear weather and calm seas in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea northwest of the Egyptian city of al-ʿArīsh, the Liberty came under repeated aerial attack by Israeli forces at approximately 2 PM, local time, followed by an assault by Israeli motor torpedo boats.

On June 10, 1967, a U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry (NCOI) into the attack was convened. Yet, notwithstanding the circumstances and lethality of the assault, the NCOI never investigated the culpability of Israeli civilian leaders and military officers for the unprovoked attack or the reasons why American forces did not come to the Liberty's aid until seventeen hours after the attack ended. As of 2005, it was the position of the U.S. Navy's highest legal authority, the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG), that "The Court of Inquiry was the only United States Government investigation into the attack." As the OJAG further aptly observed: "That investigation focused primarily on U.S. military communications problems prior to the attack and the heroic efforts of LIBERTY’s crew in damage control during the aftermath of the attack."

Yet, despite not seeking pertinent evidence and ignoring incriminating evidence already available to it, the NCOI nevertheless found that: "Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on LIBERTY on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity." Including the counsel and members of the NCOI, the product of the sham investigation was endorsed by eleven senior naval officers—three captains and eight admirals of varying ranks. The most senior military officer to endorse the NCOI's report was none other than Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, who would later affect the pose of champion of the cause of the Liberty.

On April 30, 1965, Moorer took command of the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet. As a ship of the Atlantic Fleet, the Liberty was part of Moorer's command and, in that capacity, he toured the ship and received a briefing on her mission on May 25, 1966. Moorer was still commander of the Atlantic Fleet on the day the Liberty was attacked, which was also the same day as his Senate confirmation hearing for promotion to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The record of testimony indicates that neither Moorer nor the Armed Service Committee members said anything about the attack on the Liberty. Until he left the Atlantic Fleet on June 17, 1967, Moorer was copied on key messages concerning the attack, the aftermath, and the investigation. Although was he then between commands, when the Liberty limped into the harbor of the Little Creek Amphibious Base (an Atlantic Fleet unit) on July 29, 1967—so damaged that she would never be deployed again—Moorer was absent. Moorer took over as CNO on August 1, 1967.

Thirty years later, Moorer would claim he had "never believed that the attack on the USS Liberty was a case of mistaken identity." Yet, when he had both the duty and the authority to reject the poisonous fruit of the sham investigation, he did the very opposite. When the NCOI's report finally reached his office, it was duly endorsed on March 25, 1968, in a two-page memorandum that said nothing about the attacking nation, the failure to defend the Liberty, or the wholly deficient investigation. The CNO's endorsement was the final official nail in the coffin, and the NCOI's findings have plagued the quest for transparency and accountability ever since. Moorer never publicly acknowledged, explained, or apologized for his role. Instead, he blamed the media, the President, the Secretary of Defense, and anyone else it suited him to impugn while evading responsibility for his own treachery.

It was this "negligence, cover-up, and misconduct" by Moorer, his subordinates, and others—civilians and military officers alike—that impelled LCDR Ennes to embark upon a decades-long quest to try to understand why the attack happened and why it was never properly investigated. Others had written articles and chapters, but LCDR Ennes wrote the first book on the subject. Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship was published by Random House in seven printings from 1980 to 1986, including a mass market printing under the company's Ballantine-Ivy imprint. In a 2007 addendum LCDR Ennes described the book's reception:

Because I had criticized Israel, I could be attacked on political or even ethnic and racist grounds. Because I included personal experiences, the book could be dismissed as 'merely a memoir.' Because I had criticized some aspects of U.S. Navy performance, I could be called disloyal to the Navy I love. Because I was not a recognized author or an accredited historian, my work could be dismissed on those grounds. And because I was not the first to charge that the attack was deliberate, my new evidence could be dismissed as 'nothing new.'

To no surprise, "Assault on the Liberty" was attacked on all those grounds. Many retailers refused to carry it, wholesalers and chain bookstores dropped it, distributors regularly lost or misplaced orders for it, and major reviewers such as the New York Times and all national news magazines refused to review it. Newsweek actually had a review set in type and ready to print before an order came to kill the story.

Regarding the final Random House printing, LCDR Ennes wrote:

"Assault" was to be the flagship edition of a new Ivy series of war books, to be featured in every book store in the country. 'This book will never go out of print,' Ivy told me. 'Your grandchildren will be receiving royalties.'

But that was not to be. Ivy did not anticipate the complaints from their Zionist customers. Although the 40,000-copy first printing sold out quickly, it was never reprinted. My inquiries to Ivy and those of my agent went unanswered for nearly two years. Finally, under the terms of my contract, I requested and received return of my rights so that I could republish the book independently.

On a personal note, I met Jim when, in 2017, he and Sheila, his wife, came to a meeting of my American Legion Post to present me with a plaque commemorating my induction into the USS Liberty Veterans Association (LVA) as an honorary crew member. Jim was one of the founders of LVA back in the early 1980s. I was being honored by the LVA for writing the text of American Legion National Convention Resolution 40, calling "upon the 115th United States Congress to publicly, impartially, and thoroughly investigate the attack on the USS Liberty and its aftermath ..." Once the text was written and approved by my Post and Department it was forwarded to the 2017 national convention in Reno, where it was ably shepherded to final passage by another Liberty survivor, GySgt Bryce Lockwood, USMC, ret. Without GySgt Lockwood's efforts there is no doubt that the resolution would have been killed off in committee.

We stayed in touch after that and Jim and Sheila later helped me in 2021 in obtaining a personal declaration from Rep. Pete McCloskey in my USS Liberty FOIA lawsuit. That case is Kinnucan v. National Security Agency et al. (no. 2:20-cv-01309) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The fact that the lawsuit is still ongoing almost sixty years after the attack and more than forty-five years after the publication of Jim's book underscores the fact that the U.S. government is still concealing information. It is a shameful thing that the government's cover-up has outlived another Liberty survivor especially one who suffered so much in the service of his country and who worked so hard to uncover the truth. 

In addition to our work on the case of the USS Liberty, Jim and I had at least two other things in common. First, we both enlisted in the military before earning our college degrees. I joined America's oldest continuous seagoing military service. About three decades earlier, Jim, on the other hand, had joined the U.S. Navy. Second, we were both Gators, i.e., graduates of San Francisco State University.

In closing, I didn't know Jim as well as I wish I had but I appreciated his work, his determination, and his kindness. I was glad to have met him and Sheila and glad that we stayed in touch. I will miss Jim. With all that said, I don't know if Jim was a Christian or even a religious person of any sort. So, the religious sentiment expressed here should be attributed to me alone.

Michelle J. Kinnucan was one of the “four core carvers” of the John T. Williams memorial totem pole. She is also an independent researcher.